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Abstract
Richard Saltman and Antonio Duran take up the challenging issue of governance in their article “Governance, 
Government and the Search for New Provider Models,” and use two case studies of health policy changes in Sweden and 
Spain to shed light on the subject.  In this commentary, I seek to link their conceptualization of governance, especially 
its interrelated roles at the macro, meso, and micro levels of health systems, with the case studies on which they report. 
While the case studies focus on the shifts in governance between the macro and meso levels and their impacts on 
achievement of desired policy outcomes, they also highlight the need to better integrate the dynamics of day to day 
operations within micro organizations into the overall governance picture.
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Health reforms in many countries have flowed from a desire, reified by an organizational paradigm, to reduce the dominance of government bureaucracies 
over health systems in command and control frameworks.1 
Over the last two decades, these reforms have evolved and a 
degree of policy learning has take place. This is manifested 
by the increasing focus on concepts such as governance, 
stewardship, and solidarity. This is because the impact of 
health reforms, in particular market or competitive oriented 
policies was not clear, or perhaps even comfortable to 
contemplate. In recent years, the implications of reforms 
for governance, the shifting roles of governments in health 
systems, and accountability for the results of reforms have 
begun to be more closely examined.
The paper by Saltman and Duran2 points out that health 
systems, like ships, have levels. Governance is found at the 
macro, meso and micro levels of the system, and the nexus’ 
among them. The authors stress the meso level, where
“the admixture of managerial decision-making with policy-
tied issues of multiple stakeholders results in two different 
types of performance indicators. While, traditional, mostly 
macro level concerns about equity and access remain valid 
at the meso level, a key meso level focus is on the internal 
operational factors that actually produce and deliver services: 
the day to day efficiency and effectiveness of clinical teams, 
departments and clinics for example.”
Moreover, the authors attend to the additional dimension of 
public vs. private meso level organizations, and the challenge 
of molding governance to cope with the different traditions, 
motivations and cultures of these two sectors, and to try to 
align both of them with policy goals set at the macro level. 
The problem dealt with in the paper is that the health system is 
not a ship or a boat that is being rowed, but, rather, a complex, 
adaptive system. During the 1990s, this type of new public 
management (NPM) model looked straightforward across 
many countries: the United States, the Nordic countries, 
the Netherlands, Germany, and Israel to name several. But, 
as those of us who followed its implementation in these 
different regimes and cultures noticed almost immediately, 
and to our delight since it offered much material for health 
policy analysts to work with, the form it took varied widely. 
Not all the skippers limited themselves to steering, and not 
all the rowers simply played by the rules. In some countries, 
the rowers were limited to not for profit firms, and in others 
private enterprises were admitted. In some cases, the “breakup” 
of a government monopoly on finance and provision of 
healthcare led to markets in which highly concentrated firms 
dominated. Unresponsive government bureaucracies gave 
way to rigid budget holders, less concerned with satisfying 
clients as with guarding budgets or even gaining surpluses. 
For governments, setting the rules of covered benefits, pricing 
and quality assurance turned out to be much more complex 
than drawing clear a plimsoll line above which the ship cannot 
sail, though the latter is what many policy-makers and their 
advisors pretended and perceived themselves as doing. 
Enter Governance, along with its companion terms 
Stewardship and Solidarity. The health system had now 
become littered with multiple stakeholders, often in conflict 
with one another. The injection of market mechanisms 
brought on by NPM has created strong incentives to cream 
skim, attract custom by offering a broad array of services 
including the latest medical technologies, cut costs by denying 
those very same services, negotiate hard bargains and offer 
citizens narrow selectively contracted provider networks 
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and also offer freedom of choice. The rules of the game 
instituted by government, or the sponsors, or whoever else 
was governing the system, proved inadequate to steer any ship 
through these currents of conflicting interests.
Saltman and Duran, long time observers of these trends, 
are not satisfied to watch these rowing or sailing matches as 
passive observers. In the best tradition of academic policy 
analysts, they are the Coast Guard, monitoring, intervening 
and attempting to keep the boats afloat with insights gained 
as the journey unfolds.
In their introduction to Governance: Government and the 
Search for New Provider Models,1 the authors state that, “the 
article finishes by observing that good governance cannot 
be reduced to a set of arbitrary bureaucratic rules but rather 
needs to be grounded in the day to day operational level if it is 
to have the desired effect on health sector reform outcomes.” 
This implies, as others have noted3 that there is a gap between 
macro policy measures and the front line of healthcare 
providers. In other words, the aspiration of NPM to separate 
government from the day to day activities of front line 
providers is not achievable. The challenge is to identify new 
models, some of which are likely evolving in the wake of NPM 
inspired reforms, for mediating this top-down bottom-up 
tension in order to achieve the degree of coherence necessary 
for achievement of health policy goals.
To fulfill this mission, Saltman and Duran provide case 
studies from Sweden and Spain, regarding reforms in primary 
care and the hospital sector respectively. In the Swedish case, 
the reforms were aimed at improving the responsiveness and 
continuity of primary care services. From 2007, in a number 
of Swedish counties, citizens were granted the opportunity 
to choose among not only public primary care clinics, but 
also private ones. This apparently led to increased access, but 
questions remained as to continuity of care and its quality, 
particularly in private clinics, especially those based on a 
for profit financial model. Not as many publicly employed 
primary care doctors left public employment as policy-makers 
might have anticipated. Perhaps this is due to a misreading 
of the relative weight of financial incentives compared to 
longstanding traditions of social solidarity and belief in 
public provision of healthcare on the part of physicians.4,5 
Government succeeded in steering the system towards 
increased diversification of meso level providers and patient 
choice, both values that, apparently, could not be produced by 
governance within a command and control system, or even 
in a decentralized, but totally public system due to various 
bureaucratic obstacles. On the other hand, the entrance of new 
primary care “owners,” especially private ones, into the system 
raises issues of transparency and accountability that remain 
unresolved. In other words, the mechanisms of governance 
are unable to guarantee these key values.
Turning the Spanish case, the governance shift involved 
granting increased autonomy to public hospitals. Spanish 
policy-makers experimented with four different models: 
Public health enterprises in which staff are non statutory 
and reimbursed on a performance basis; Foundations which 
are not for profit organizations that can decide on their own 
basket of services and investments, and staff are not statutory; 
Consortia, which result from mergers of public authorities, 
have autonomy to sell services beyond the public basket and 
staff are not statutory; and Administrative Concessions, in 
which a private company builds and operates the hospital, 
and staff have the option of remaining statutory or moving 
to non statutory status. One aspect of governance that has 
been problematic according to the authors is the lack of 
evaluation of the results of introducing these new institutional 
arrangements. Supporters of the reforms argue that the 
new models demonstrate increased efficiency and higher 
patient satisfaction rates. Opponents, apparently including 
professional unions, argue that the semi-autonomous hospitals 
have higher costs.1 To the reader, this is not surprising, as all 
the models convert statutory workers to non-statutory status, 
but the authors do not highlight this aspect.
This last point highlights an undercurrent of conceptual 
tension in the paper. As mentioned, the authors state clearly 
at the outset that they focus on the meso level. But in their 
own words it is at the meso level that macro policy interfaces 
with internal operations and “at the meso and micro levels, 
in particular, management as well as policy decisions become 
inexorably intertwined as part of institutional governance.”1 
This suggests that, for example, how meso level organizations 
govern their relations with the micro level, primarily front line 
physicians, nurses and other providers, would be addressed 
more explicitly. This is not so much a critique as to point out 
that the paper suggests that more work needs to be done to 
assess the implications of governance shifts between the macro 
and meso levels on what actually happens at the micro level. 
As pointed out elsewhere, if front line providers’ socialization 
and perceptions are disparate from the intentions of policy 
changes at higher levels of the system, this must be attended 
to by governance in order for reforms to have their desired 
impact.4,6
This returns us to the authors’ point that “good governance 
cannot be reduced to a set of arbitrary bureaucratic rules.” 
Their case studies illustrate that behavior of individuals, 
such as physicians, in reacting to new rules are sometimes 
difficult to anticipate, for example Swedish physicians in 
deciding whether to abandon the public sector for more 
private employment relations. How does front line staff 
react to non-statutory status in the Spanish case? And, as 
the authors point out, what is the impact on quality and 
continuity of care of the managerial steps taken by meso level 
organizations to increase efficiency? It is beyond the scope 
of this commentary to answer these questions. However, 
it appears that relative to the macro and meso levels, less is 
known about the perceptions and responses of micro level 
actors regarding changes in governance. How do physicians 
react to having their performance measured? What are the 
implications of policy changes for professional roles, for 
example the shifting of more responsibility to nurses, nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants? How does governance 
manifest itself in the modes of communication between meso 
level managers and front line providers? Indeed, how much 
of change in delivery systems is initiated top-down and how 
much emerges from the coping of front line providers with 
shifting environments – more competition, constrained 
resources, technology change- as well as with the top-down 
policies themselves? There is a nascent literature on trust 
in health organizations, intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivations, 
the use of big data in health management, and continuous 
Chinitz
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2016, 5(9), 553–555 555
quality improvement. But this literature remains tentative and 
inchoate, and certainly not well-integrated with the literature 
on governance illustrated by the paper by Saltman and Duran.
All of this suggests that good governance in changing 
health systems under persistent pressure to contain costs 
while improving access and maintaining quality and equity, 
requires a smooth meeting of top-down policy initiatives, 
that inevitably take the form of rules such as incentives and 
regulations, with bottom-up innovations in micro delivery 
systems involving front line staff. Solidarity and trust appear 
to have a role in enabling the stewards of the system to induce 
good governance. Dealing with these elements coaxes analysts 
and policy-makers to venture beyond the boundaries of clear, 
if illusory, bureaucratic rules and bottom line measures, into 
the realm of culture, norms, and values that are more difficult 
to define, measure and manage. But that is where good 
governance lies.
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